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Abstract: For a two-period closed loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, Stackelberg game 
analyses are conducted to examine pricing and warranty decisions under two warranty models depending on who offers 
warranty for new and remanufactured products and the corresponding benchmark models with warranty for new products only. 
Next, we identify the conditions under which warranty for remanufactured products is offered and investigate how this 
warranty affects the CLSC operations. Subsequently, comparative studies are carried out to examine equilibrium decisions, 
profitability and consumer surplus of the CLSC between the two warranty models. Analytical results show that offering 
warranty for remanufactured products does not affect new product pricing in period 2, but influences pricing of new products 
in period 1 and remanufactured products in period 2, thereby enhancing remanufacturing, individual and channel profitability, 
and consumer surplus. Compared to the retailer warranty for remanufactured products, the manufacturer warranty can attain a 
more equitable profit distribution. If the warranty cost advantage of the manufacturer (retailer) is significant relative to that of 
the retailer (the manufacturer), the manufacturer (retailer) arises as a natural choice to offer warranty for remanufactured 
products as this decision enhances both profitability and consumer surplus. 
Keywords: Closed loop supply chain (CLSC); Remanufacturing; Warranty; Pricing decision; Stackelberg game 
 
1 Introduction 
Remanufacturing is often considered as an ideal choice for recycling and reuse of used products (Esenduran et al., 2016). As a 
sustainable and green development mode, remanufacturing fosters the formation of a recycling industrial chain and lays the 
foundation for green and circular development of the economy. Governments at different levels have issued diverse regulatory 
policies to encourage remanufacturing. For instance, in July 2013, led by the National Development and Reform Commission, 
China's five ministries jointly issued the Pilot Program on “Bartering Used for Remanufactured Products” to promote 
remanufacturing. In 2015, the United States House of Representatives passed the Federal Vehicle Repair Cost Savings Act to 
require federal agencies to consider using remanufactured parts for vehicle fleet repairs. Since more and more countries 
recognize the importance of and commit support to remanufacturing, an increasing number of enterprises are entering the 
remanufacturing arena (such as Kodak, Xerox, Siemens, Lenovo and Caterpillar), resulting in rapid growth in the 
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remanufacturing industry. In 2013, the annual sales of global remanufacturing industry were more than 150 billion U.S. dollars 
and the United States alone reached more than 100 billion U.S. dollars (Liu et al., 2017). Meanwhile, remanufacturing has also 
drawn significant attention from academia and has been extensively studied in recent years (Atasu et al., 2009; Ferrer and 
Swaminathan, 2010; Liu et al., 2019; Ma et al., 2016; Özdemir and Denizel, 2012; Savaskan et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2017).  
Although remanufacturing has made significant progress in theory and practice, it still faces many challenges such as 
consumers’ low perceived quality of and willingness-to-pay for remanufactured products (Abbey et al., 2015). Among all 
factors influencing consumers’ willingness-to-pay for remanufactured products, the retail price and consumers’ perceived 
quality are the two most important considerations. Understandably, the lower the retail price and the higher the perceived 
quality, the greater the demand for remanufactured products (Abbey et al., 2015). However, if the remanufactured product is 
priced too low, consumers may lose confidence in its quality. Therefore, it is not viable to purely rely on aggressive pricing to 
stimulate demand for remanufactured products (Esenduran et al., 2016). In many cases, remanufactured and new products have 
comparable levels of quality, but consumers tend to discount the quality of remanufactured products. If effective methods can 
be developed to improve consumers’ perception on the quality of remanufactured products or appropriate mechanisms can be 
devised to convey to consumers the right quality signal of remanufactured products, their market demand will be properly 
stimulated (Abbey et al., 2015). Generally speaking, product warranty is a proven mechanism to signal product quality to 
consumers. A longer warranty period tends to enhance consumers' confidence in and perception of product quality (Dai et al., 
2012). Therefore, offering warranty for remanufactured products is presumably able to strengthen consumers’ 
willingness-to-pay.  
Researchers have conducted some studies on warranty policies for remanufactured products (Alqahtani and Gupta, 2017; 
Liao, 2018; Zhu et al., 2016), and their results indicate that a warranty policy for remanufactured products, such as a refund 
warranty, can enhance the remanufacturer’s profit. In a CLSC where the manufacturer is responsible for remanufacturing, 
operational decisions are often made in two or multiple periods. For instance, for a two-period CLSC with remanufacturing, 
the manufacturer prices and provides warranty for new products in the first period and, then, collects used products to produce 
remanufactured products, prices and provides warranty for both products in the second period. In this context, it would be 
interesting to know if the results obtained from a single-period model are still applicable to the two-period model. Furthermore, 
warranty for products can be provided by either the manufacturer or the retailer (Dai et al., 2012; Bian et al., 2019). So, it is a 
worthy topic to investigate who is a better choice to offer warranty for new and remanufactured products in terms of 
profitability and consumer surplus in a two-period setting. We attempt to deal with this significant problem by resorting to 
Stackelberg game analyses. In reality, a warranty policy for new and remanufactured products may contain different clauses 
such as scope, free replacement, and refund (Alqahtani and Gupta, 2017; Liao, 2018). In this research, we focus on the 
warranty period of free replacement to investigate the provider’s warranty decision and its efficiency. 
More specifically, this study first examines the pricing and warranty period decisions under two warranty models where 
either the manufacturer or the retailer offers warranty for new and remanufactured products and the corresponding benchmark 
models with warranty for new products only in a two-period CLSC. We then investigate the impact of warranty on the 
operational decisions and efficiency of the CLSC from the perspectives of individual and channel profitability as well as 
consumer surplus. Subsequently, we explore who arises as a better warranty provider from the manufacturer’s, retailer’s, 
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CLSC’s and consumer’s angle. This study attempts to address the following three questions. 
 How does the warranty affect the pricing decisions of new products in both periods and of remanufactured products in 
the second period?  
 Does warranty enhance market demand for remanufactured products and the profit of the warranty provider and the 
other CLSC member?  
 Is the manufacturer or the retailer a better warranty provider in terms of individual and channel profitability as well as 
consumer surplus?  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 conducts a brief literature review. Section 3 presents the 
problem description and assumptions. Section 4 establishes two-period CLSC Stackelberg game models with the manufacturer 
or the retailer being the warranty provider for new and remanufactured products as well as the corresponding benchmark 
models with warranty for new products only, and derives their equilibrium solutions. In Section 5, we discuss the effect of 
offering warranty for remanufactured products on the operations of the CLSC, and analyze the warranty efficiency in the two 
warranty models. Section 6 presents numerical experiment to illustrate the propositions and reports further results for more 
general cases. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7. 
2 Literature Review  
This paper draws on and contributes to two streams of literature: pricing decisions of CLSCs and warranty policies for new and 
second-hand (remanufactured) products. 
2.1 Pricing decisions of CLSCs 
Extensive research has been conducted on pricing decisions of new, used and remanufactured products in CSLCs under 
different contexts. For example, some researchers focus on the optimal pricing under certain government regulations (Atasu et 
al., 2009; Esenduran et al., 2016; Özdemir and Denizel, 2012; Wang et al., 2018; Zhou et al., 2017), some literature 
investigates these pricing decisions under different collection patterns (Atasu et al., 2013; Govindan et al., 2017; He et al., 
2019; Savaskan et al., 2004) and various decision structures (Ferrer and Swaminathan, 2006, 2010; Wang et al., 2017; Xiong et 
al., 2013). In addition, many articles jointly optimize pricing and other decisions such as product design (Örsdemir et al., 2014; 
Wu, 2013), remanufacturing authorization (Hong et al., 2017; Oraiopoulos et al., 2012) and warranty policy decisions. 
It is a relatively new research topic to consider the pricing decision under warranty for new or remanufactured products. 
By assuming both linear and nonlinear demand functions for remanufactured products in a single period setting, Yazdian et al. 
(2014) investigate the remanufacturer’s optimal collection price of used products, sale price and warranty period of 
remanufactured products. Zhu et al. (2016) optimize the warranty length and selling price for remanufactured products under 
free-replacement and extended warranty services from the remanufacturer’s perspective and their empirical analysis indicates 
that the remanufacturer profits more from the free-replacement warranty than the extended warranty service. Liao (2018) 
focuses on a partial-refund warranty policy for remanufactured products and develops a newsvendor model to explore the 
impact of this warranty policy on product pricing decisions, members’ profits and consumer surplus. Giri et al. (2018) assume 
that the warranty period for new products affects the collection quantity of used products and investigate the optimal price of 
new and remanufactured products and warranty period of new products when the manufacturer refurbishes and remanufactures 
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defective products.  
This brief literature review reveals that extant research tends to focus on warranty for either new or remanufactured 
products in a single period and does not consider pricing decisions with warranty offering to both products by the same 
warranty provider. In contrast, this paper incorporates warranty for both new and remanufactured products in a two-period 
CLSC setting and examines the impact of offering warranty on the pricing decisions of both products in different periods. 
2.2 Warranty for new and second-hand (remanufactured) products 
Researchers have conducted extensive studies on product warranty from different angles. Warranty studies in operational 
management can be grouped into three streams: Estimation of warranty cost, optimization of the warranty service level and 
efficiency analysis of warranty policies. 
Warranty cost depends on product reliability, rectification and warranty terms, so a bulk of literature considers it from the 
angles of the product failure rate and warranty policy at the component and product level (Murthy and Djamaludin, 2002; 
Wang and Xie, 2018). For new products, Polatoglu and Sahin (1998) derive a probability distribution of the warranty cost for 
pro-rata warranties; Liu et al (2015) develop warranty cost models for series and parallel systems with failure interaction under 
renewing free-replacement warranty; Park et al. (2016) develop a new warranty cost model for a renewable two-dimensional 
policy based on failure time and warranty servicing time; Zhang et al. (2018) analyze the expected warranty cost for 
non-renewing and renewing free replacement policy in a two-series system with stochastically dependent components; Luo and 
Wu (2019) estimate the warranty cost originated from software, hardware failures or human errors as well as their interactions. 
As for second-hand products, Chattopadhyay and Murthy (2000) develop probabilistic models to estimate their expected 
warranty cost under free replacement or pro-rata warranty at the component and system level. Shafiee et al. (2011) estimate the 
warranty cost based on past age, usage, service strategy and reliability of second-hand products. Alqahtani and Gupta (2017) 
examine the impact of warranty for remanufactured products from a remanufacturer’s perspective and furnish an approach to 
minimize the warranty cost. The aforesaid literature provides theoretical bases for optimizing warranty policies and many 
studies build upon these warranty cost models to examine their specific problems (Chen et al., 2012; Dan et al., 2017; Giri et 
al., 2018; Luo and Wu, 2018; Wei et al., 2015). This paper differs from existing literature by combining the features of cost 
structure in two papers (Chen et al., 2012; Wei et al., 2015) and takes a more generic form to model the warranty cost in our 
CLSC. 
The warranty service level can be reflected in different aspects, ranging from the length of the warranty period, the 
comprehensive service level consisting of warranty period and coverage, to refund due to product failure. For new products, 
Chen et al. (2012, 2017), Chie (2005), Esmaeili et al. (2014), Giri et al. (2018), Park et al. (2016), Taleizadeh et al. (2017), Wei 
et al. (2015), Xie (2017) and Zhang et al. (2019) explore the optimal warranty period under different specific scenarios. Dan et 
al.（2017）investigate the optimal warranty service level, added-value service level and their interaction in a cooperative and 
competitive context. Li et al. (2018) formulate a two-period model to analyze the optimal warranty compensation strategy 
when the consumer’s quality perception and valuation change. For second-hand and remanufactured products, Chattopadhyay 
and Rahman (2010), Lu and Shang (2019) study the optimal warranty for second-hand products; Yazdian et al. (2014) and Zhu 
et al. (2016) optimize the warranty period of remanufactured products from the remanufacturer’s perspectives. Liao (2018) 
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focuses on a partial-refund warranty policy for remanufactured products. This literature review shows that it is a key concern 
to determine the warranty period and this has been extensively studied. However, existing research is typically confined to a 
single period setting and optimizing the warranty period for a single product (either new, second-hand, or remanufactured 
product). In contrast, this paper establishes a two-period CLSC where a warranty provider (either the manufacturer or the 
retailer) furnishes warranty for new products in both periods and warranty for remanufactured products in the second period. 
This new model setup allows us to determine the optimal warranty period of remanufactured products and examine how the 
operations of the two-period CLSC is affected by offering warranty for both new and remanufactured products.  
In the stream of warranty efficiency, Zhou et al. (2009) compare a non-renewing with a renewing warranty policy for 
repairable products with known market entry and departure under consumer’s risk aversion. Their research reveals that the 
renewing warranty policy is more conductive to the warranty provider. Dai et al. (2012) focus on the impact of product quality 
and warranty period decisions on supply chain performance under two scenarios where the warranty period is determined by 
the manufacturer or the supplier. Chari et al. (2016) study the optimal warranty policy of a manufacturer who services products 
within the warranty period by replacing defective components with new or reconditioned ones. Mo et al. (2017) provide a 
hybrid warranty policy combining free-replacement warranty with the buyer’s investment in prevention management. Zhu et al. 
(2019) establish a model to determine the product reliability, warranty policy, pricing decisions in the period of regular and 
promotion sales, and compare four nonrenewable warranty policies to provide managerial insights on warranty policy selection. 
Existing literature pays more attention to efficiency of different warranty policies, but this research assesses warranty 
efficiency from a service provider’s perspective. More specifically, this paper examines warranty efficiency by allowing the 
manufacturer or the retailer to offer warranty for both new and remanufactured products in a two-period CLSC and this 
assessment is conducted under the criteria of profitability and consumer surplus. 
Table 1 shows the difference between our paper with existing studies on pricing decision in a CLSC and warranty 
decision in general supply chain management in a proper literature context. The literature review and Table 1 reveal that the 
majority of research is confined to either pricing or warranty decision for a single product (new, remanufactured, or 
second-hand product) and limited attention is dedicated to examining joint warranty and pricing decisions for remanufactured 
products in a single period (Alqahtani and Gupta, 2017; Liao, 2018; Yazdian et al., 2014; Zhu et al., 2016). On the other hand, 
the focus of this paper differs from existing studies in that it jointly optimizes pricing and warranty decisions where either the 
manufacturer or the retailer provides warranty service for both new and remanufactured products in a two-period CLSC setting. 
We then examine the interaction of warranty and pricing decisions and the implications on the CLSC performance from both 
profitability and consumer surplus angles, thereby assessing warranty efficiency offered by different parties. 
 












Alqahtani and Gupta (2017)  N N Y N N 
Chen et al. (2012) N Y N Y N 
Dai et al. (2012) N Y N Y Y 
Esmaeili et al. (2014) N Y N Y N 
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Ferrer and Swaminathan (2010) Y N N N N 
Giri et al. (2018) N Y N Y N 
He et al. (2019) N N N N N 
Liao (2018) N N Y N N 
Li et al. (2018) Y Y N N N 
Park et al.(2016) N Y N Y N 
Savaskan et al. (2004) N N N N N 
Taleizadeh et al. (2017) N Y N Y N 
Wang et al. (2018) Y N N N N 
Wei et al. (2015) N Y N Y N 
Xie et al. (2017) N Y N Y N 
Yazdian et al. (2016) N N Y Y N 
Zhu et al. (2016) N N Y Y N 
Zhu et al. (2019) N Y N Y N 
Our paper Y Y Y Y Y 
3 Problem description and model assumptions 
In a two-period CLSC consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, the manufacturer is modeled as the leader and organizes 
production in response to market demand for new products in period 1; in period 2, it continues to produce new products, 
collects and remanufactures used products as a result of new product sales in period 1. The retailer is modeled as the follower 
and sets the retail prices for new and remanufactured products to sell them to the end market. Generally, only a portion of used 
products can be collected and remanufactured, so 1rq q , where 0 1   is the collection yield and defined as the fraction 
of new products made in period 1 that is available for remanufacturing in period 2 (Atasu et al., 2013; Ferrer and Swaminathan, 
2006, 2010). Here, 1q  is the sale quantity of new products in period 1, rq  is the demand for remanufactured products in 
period 2. Conceptually, the profit obtained in period 2 should be discounted into the present value in period 1 (Ferrer and 
Swaminathan, 2006, 2010). For simplicity and without loss of generality, we ignore this discount factor following extant 
literature (Ferguson and Toktay, 2010; Hong et al., 2017; Wu, 2013). 
Remanufactured products are generally perceived to be of lower quality compared to new products, and consumers tend 
to demonstrate loss-averse preference. Thus, to promote sales of remanufactured products, the manufacturer or retailer can 
resort to offering a warranty policy to boost consumers’ confidence. Although a warranty policy for products typically contains 
different items (Alqahtani and Gupta, 2017; Liao, 2018), this research focuses on the warranty period of free replacement. 
Without loss of generality, the warranty period for new products is the same in the two periods and is denoted by n and that for 
remanufactured products is denoted by t. If 0t  , the manufacturer or retailer provides warranty for remanufactured products. 
If 0t  , the manufacturer or retailer does not provide warranty for remanufactured products. In general, n and t are different 
and t n  is commonly observed in practice. For instance, eBay provides a 5-year warranty period for new Big Ball Canister 
vacuum cleaner but only a 2-year for a remanufactured one. Lenovo provides the same 1-year warranty period for new and 
refurbished laptops. For simplicity, we normalize n  to 1 and assume that 1t  . The results derived from this simplified case 
can be extended to the more general case when n  is set at different values. 
Consumers’ willingness-to-pay for new products is set as  , which is assumed to be uniformly distributed in the whole 
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market capacity Q in each period. Consumers’ willingness-to-pay for remanufactured products in period 2 is set as  , where 
[0,1)   denotes the consumer’s value discount for remanufactured products. Given the warranty period n  and t  for new 
and remanufactured products, the utilities for consumers to purchase new products are 1 1 nu p n     and  
n n nu p n     in the two periods, respectively; the utility to purchase remanufactured products is r r ru p t     in 
period 2. Here, 0n  ( 0r  ) measures the impact of the warranty period n ( t ) on the consumers’ willingness-to-pay for 
new (remanufactured) products. Following Liu et al. (2017) and Li and Chen (2018), consumers make purchasing decision in 
the principle of utility maximization. Assume that 1  and n  denote the set of consumers purchasing new products in 
period 1 and 2, respectively, and r  represents the set of consumers purchasing remanufactured products in period 2, that is 
1 1{ : 0}v u   , { max{ ,0}}n n rv u u  ：  and { max{ ,0}}r r nv u u  ： . Hence, by setting n = 1, demand for new and 
remanufactured products is derived as 1 1 nq Q p    , 1





















The manufacturer produces as per market demand 1q , nq  and rq .  
We assume that warranty for new and remanufactured products is provided for consumers by either the manufacturer or 
the retailer and the warranty provider incurs the warranty cost over both periods. In each period, the warranty cost consists of a 
linear component jnwc k (
j












rwc ) is a linear 
maintenance cost for malfunctions of a new (remanufactured) product in each unit time. Parameter jnw (
j
rw ) is the quadratic 
cost coefficient for offering new (remanufactured) product warranty. This warranty cost structure combines the features in two 
existing articles (Chen et al., 2012; Wei et al., 2015) and takes a more general form. If 0jnwc   ( 0
j
rwc  ), the cost structure is 
consistent with that in (Wei et al., 2015); if 0jnw  ( 0
j
rw  ), it is the same as that in (Chen et al., 2012). Here, { , }j M R  
represents the manufacturer and retailer, respectively. The remanufactured product is assumed to be as good as the new product, 
and warranty for new and remanufactured products is provided by the same member. As such, we assume that the linear and 
quadratic warranty cost parameters for a new product are the same as those for a remanufactured product, i.e., j j jnw rw wc c c   
and j j jnw rw w    . The unit production costs of new and remanufactured products are nc  and rc , and r nc c . It is noted 
that a unit collection cost is often assumed in a typical CLSC setting when a used product is recycled for remanufacturing 
period 2 (Atasu et al., 2013; Ma et al., 2016). Without loss of generality, we assume that rc  here incorporates the collection 
cost into the unit remanufacturing cost and this assumption does not materially change the main results derived in this paper. 
To make remanufacturing economically sensible, given consumers’ value discount  , it is assumed that ( )jr n w nc c c    . 
This assumption is similar as that in existing literature (Esenduran et al., 2016).  
In this research, we analyze the impact of the warranty policy on pricing decisions and operational efficiency of the CLSC 
under two warranty models, where either the manufacturer or the retailer offers warranty for new and remanufactured products 
(denoted by MM or RR accordingly) over two periods. In addition, to facilitate comparative analyses, we consider two 
benchmark models where the manufacturer or the retailer offers warranty for new products only (denoted by MN or RN 
accordingly). The manufacturer and retailer are rational and profit maximizers. Hereafter, i
j  denotes the profit of member j 
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under model i, and i
T  denotes the channel profit of the CLSC; { , , , }i MM RR MN RN , { , }j M R . 
In addition, let CS denote consumer surplus obtained from purchasing new and remanufactured products over the two 
periods , which is calculated as 2 2 21
1
( 2 )
2 n n r r
CS q q q q q     (Yenipazarli, 2016). 
Table 2 summarizes the symbols and notation used in this paper. For a more concise presentation of equilibrium solutions, 
we further introduce 0 ( )
j
j n w nQ c c     , 1 ( )
j
j n w n rc c c      , 2 (1 )
j
j w     , 3
j
j r wc   , 4 0 1j j j    , 
2
0 1 (1 )      , 
2
2 34MM M M    , 
2
2 34RR R R    , 
24 MMM Mw M    , and 
22 RRR Rw R    . 
Table 2. Parameters and decision variables. 
Symbol Definition 
nc / rc  The unit production cost of a new/remanufactured product 
1w / 1p / 1q  The unit wholesale price/retail price/sale quantity of new products in period 1 
nw / rw  The unit wholesale price of a new/remanufactured product in period 2 
np / rp  The unit retail price of a new/remanufactured product in period 2 
nq / rq  Sales quantity of new/remanufactured products in period 2 
Q The whole market capacity in each period 
  Consumer’s willingness-to-pay for the new product in each period 
  Consumer’s value discount for the remanufactured product 
t  Warranty period for the remanufactured product 





The linear/quadratic warranty cost parameter for remanufactured and new products incurred by the 
warranty provider j, { , }j M R  
r  The impact of warranty period t  on the consumer’s willingness-to-pay for the remanufactured product 
n  The impact of warranty period n on the consumer’s willingness-to-pay for the new product 
i
j  Profit function of member j in model i, { , , , }i MM RR MN RN  
iCS  Consumer surplus in model i   
4 Model formulation and equilibrium solution 
Since we normalize the warranty period for new products to be n = 1 and assume the warranty period for remanufactured 
products 1t n  , the warranty provider’s decision on the warranty period is confined to remanufactured products for the 
remainder of this research. On the other hand, the linear and quadratic warranty costs for new products in both periods are 
incorporated into the warranty provider’s profit function by using n = 1. 
4.1 Model MM– the manufacturer offers warranty for new and remanufactured products 
In model MM, the manufacturer provides warranty for new and remanufactured products. The profit functions of the 




( , , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
MM M M M M M
M n r n w n n w n r r w r w ww w w t w c c q w c c q w c c t q t                           (1) 
1 1 1 1( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
MM
R n r n n n r r rp p p p w q p w q p w q                                  (2) 
1. . 0 rs t q q   
The constraint means that the quantity of remanufactured products is constrained by a proportion of new products that are 
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collected and remanufactured after one period of use. Since the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower, the 
decision sequence is as follows. Stage 1: the manufacturer decides the wholesale price of new products and, then, the retailer 
decides its retail price in period 1. Stage 2: the manufacturer decides the wholesale price of new and remanufactured products 
as well as the warranty period for remanufactured products and, then, the retailer decides the retail price of both products in 
period 2. According to backward induction, model MM has a unique optimal solution if 22 3 04MM M M     . Given the unit 
remanufacturing cost rc , we derive the equilibrium decisions as follows. 






   

     , the manufacturer remanufactures part of available used products (referred to 
































  ; the 













   , and 
* 0 1 2 34
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    , the manufacturer remanufactures all available used products (referred to as complete 





















2 02 ( )(2 ) (4 (1 (1 ) ( () ))
2











c           

       








  ; the 


















   , and 
0 4 2 3* ( )( )
4






    


   .  
The derivation process of the equilibrium solution is furnished in Appendix A-1. 
4.2 Model RR– the retailer offers warranty for new and remanufactured products 
In model RR, the retailer offers warranty for new and remanufactured products, and the profit functions of the manufacturer 
and retailer can be formulated as: 
1 1 1( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
RR
M n r n n n n r r rw w w w c q w c q w c q                                    (3) 
2
1 1 1 1
1
( , , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
RR R R R R R
R n r w n n w n r r w r w wp p p t p w c q p w c q p w c t q t                            (4) 
1. . 0 rs t q q   
The constraint is the same as that in model MM. Since the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower, the 
decision sequence is as follows. Stage 1: the manufacturer decides the wholesale price of new products and, then, the retailer 
decides its retail price in period 1. Stage 2: the manufacturer decides the wholesale price of new and remanufactured products 
and, then, the retailer decides the retail price of both products and the warranty period for remanufactured products in period 2. 
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According to backward induction, model RR has a unique optimal solution if 22 32 0RR R R     . Given the unit 
remanufacturing cost rc , one obtains the equilibrium decisions as follows. 
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
     , the manufacturer commits to partial remanufacturing. In this case, the optimal 
pricing and warranty period decisions are * 01 2
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    , the manufacturer is engaged in complete remanufacturing, and the equilibrium decisions 
are obtained as * 41
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  . 
The derivation process of the equilibrium solution is provided in Appendix A-2. 
4.3 Benchmark models  
To facilitate the impact analysis of warranty on supply chain operations, two benchmark models are formulated as follows, 
where the manufacturer and the retailer, respectively, offer warranty for new products only, denoted as MN and RN 
accordingly.  
(1) Model MN– the manufacturer offers warranty for new products only 
Model MN is the simplified case of model MM where t =0, meaning that the manufacturer provides warranty for new 
products only. In this model, when 0 0 0( ) (1 ) ( )M M r MQ c Q            , the manufacturer commits to partial 
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   

    . 
The derivation process of the equilibrium solution is given in Appendix A-3.  
(2) Model RN– the retailer offers warranty for new products only 
Model RN is the simplified case of model RR where t =0, meaning that the retailer offers warranty for new products only, 
but no warranty for remanufactured products. In this model, when 0 0 0( ) (1 ) ( )R R r RQ c Q            , the 
manufacturer commits to partial remanufacturing; the equilibrium decisions are * 01 2
RN P R
nw c
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0 00 ( ) (1 )r R Rc Q         , the manufacturer commits to complete remanufacturing; the equilibrium decisions are 
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The derivation process of the equilibrium solution is detailed in Appendix A-4. 
5 Main results and comparative analyses 
5.1 An impact analysis of warranty on remanufacturing and supply chain operations   
Lemma 1. The manufacturer in model MM (the retailer in model RR) offers warranty for remanufactured products if and only 
if 3 0wj
j
r c    , { , }j M R . 
The proof of Lemma 1 is obvious by examining the equilibrium warranty period decisions in Section 4.1 and 4.2. Loosely 
speaking, 3j  gauges the net benefit of offering warranty for remanufactured products. The manufacturer in model MM and 
the retailer in model RR are willing to offer warranty ( * 0it  , { , }i MM RR ) if and only if they can benefit from it ( 3 0j  ). 
Otherwise, they will not offer warranty for remanufactured products ( * 0it  , { , }i MM RR ). If 3 0j  , keeping other 
things equal, the larger the 3j , the longer the warranty period. However, there exists an upper limit for the increased warranty 





2 MM M M








M wM M    
     (  43 42 2 021 324 R RwR R      ) when the manufacturer commits to complete 
remanufacturing. 
Proposition 1. Compared to models MN and RN, the following results hold:  
i) When the manufacturer commits to partial remanufacturing, the wholesale price of remanufactured products is higher in 
model MM than that in model MN, but it is the same in models RR and RN; offering warranty for remanufactured products 
leads to a higher retail price of remanufactured products, but does not affect the wholesale or retail price of new products in 
both periods. 
ii) When the manufacturer commits to complete remanufacturing, the wholesale price of remanufactured products is 
higher in model MM than that in model MN, and it is lower in model RR than that in model RN; offering warranty for 
remanufactured products leads to a higher retailer price of remanufactured products, a higher wholesale price and a lower retail 
price of new products in period 1 , but it has no effect on pricing decisions of new products in period 2. 
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix B. 
It is understandable that offering warranty for remanufactured products conveys a right quality signal to customers and 
increases consumers’ utility of purchasing remanufactured products, thereby enhancing the sales of remanufactured products 
( * *MM h MN hr rq q
   and * *RR h RN hr rq q
  , { , }h P C ), exacerbating demand cannibalization for new products in period 2 
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( * *MM h MN hn nq q
   and * *RR h RN hn nq q
  ). To curb profit loss in the new product market and maintain differentiated competition 
between new and remanufactured products in period 2, the manufacturer (retailer) does not adjust its wholesale price (retail 
price) of new products, thereby stabilizing the profit margin of new products ( * *MM h MN hn nw w
  , * *RR h RN hn nw w
  , * *MM h MN hn np p
  , 
and * *RR h RN hn np p
  ). 
The impact of warranty for remanufactured products on pricing decisions of new products in period 1 and 
remanufactured products is closely related to the manufacturer’s remanufacturing strategy. When the manufacturer commits to 
partial remanufacturing, offering warranty for remanufactured products has no effect on pricing decisions of new products in 
period 1. In terms of wholesale pricing of remanufactured products, in model MM where the manufacturer offers warranty and 
incurs warranty cost, it can pass the increased warranty cost onto the retailer by bumping up the wholesale price 
( * *MM P MN Pr rw w
  ). On the other hand, in model RR where the retailer provides warranty and bears warranty cost, as the 
follower in the CLSC, it has no mechanism to influence the manufacturer’s wholesale price of remanufactured products 
( * *RR P RN Pr rw w
  ). As for the retail price, offering warranty incurs additional cost to the manufacturer (retailer) in the MM (RR) 
model. In model MM, the manufacturer transfers part of this cost to the retailer by increasing the wholesale price, leading the 
retailer to raise its retail price ( * *MM P MN Pr rp p
  ). In model RR, the retailer has to pass this additional warranty cost onto the 
customers by increasing the retail price of remanufactured products ( * *RR P RN Pr rp p
  ). 
When the manufacturer remanufactures all available used products, remanufactured products in period 2 and new 
products in period 1 are complements. In this case, compared to producing new products, remanufacturing has significant cost 
advantage in the first place and offering warranty for remanufactured products will further enhance consumer’s 
willingness-to-pay and demand for remanufactured products. For the wholesale price of remanufactured products, when the 
manufacturer offers warranty for remanufactured products in model MM, it can raise its wholesale price to share the benefit of 
enhanced demand for remanufactured products ( * *MM C MN Cr rw w
  ). When the retailer offers warranty for remanufactured 
products in model RR, the manufacturer lowers its wholesale price to compensate the retailer for its warranty cost 
( * *RR C RN Cr rw w
  ). It is understandable that the retailer will charge a higher retail price for remanufactured products to absorb 
the additional cost when warranty is extended to them by the manufacturer (retailer) in model MM (RR) ( * *MM C MN Cr rp p
   
and * *RR C RN Cr rp p
  ). Furthermore, the enhanced demand for remanufactured products requires more new products due to the 
complementary product relationship, allowing the retailer to lower the retail price of new products ( * *1 1
MM C MN Cp p   and 
* *
1 1
RR C RN Cp p  ) in period 1, thereby boosting the sale of new products and, eventually, resulting in more available used 
products for remanufacturing in period 2. As the retailer is closer to the end market and directly benefits from enhanced 
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demand for remanufactured products when warranty is extended to them, the profitability of the retailer increases much more 
than that of the manufacturer from the remanufactured product channel. To achieve an equitable allocation of the benefit, the 
manufacturer raises its wholesale price of new products to rake in more profit from this channel ( * *1 1
MM C MN Cw w   and 
* *
1 1
RR C RN Cw w  ) in models MM and RR in period 1. By collaborating with each other, both members achieve higher 
profitability by balancing their benefit from the new and remanufactured product channels. 
Proposition 2. Compared to benchmark models MN and RN, offering warranty for remanufactured products improves 
individual and channel profits, and consumer surplus. 
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix C. 
Proposition 2 indicates that the combined effect of pricing decisions and resulting quantities from offering warranty for 
remanufactured products leads to heightened individual and channel profitability as well as consumer surplus in the CLSC in 
MM and RR warranty models compared to the corresponding benchmark models MN and RN offering warranty for new 
products only ( * *hM hM MNj j 
  , * *hR hR RNj j 
  , { , }j M R ; * *hM hM MNT T 
  , * *hR hR RNT T 
  , * *M hMM NhCS CS  , and 
* *R hRR NhCS CS  , { , }h P C ). This result remains true regardless of the manufacturer’s remanufacturing strategy, indicating 
that offering warranty for remanufactured products is mutually beneficial for the manufacturer, retailer, and consumers. The 
implication is that a wise choice is for the manufacturer or the retailer to extend warranty to remanufactured products. This is 
consistent with business practices in reality: Caterpillar and Lenovo, for example, provide warranty for remanufactured 
products comparable to that for their new products. 
Corollary 1. The following results hold:  
i) Compared to model MN, the increase in the manufacturer’s profit is lower than the retailer’s profit enhancement in 
model MM.  
ii) Compared to model RN, the increase in the manufacturer’s profit is higher than the retailer’s profit enhancement in 
model RR. 
The proof of Corollary 1 is given in Appendix D. 
When the manufacturer offers warranty for remanufactured products in model MM, the manufacturer directly incurs the 
warranty cost, but its benefit from enhanced demand for remanufactured products is secondary. On the other hand, the retailer 
directly benefits from enhanced demand owing to offering warranty for remanufactured products, but its sharing of warranty 
cost is secondary. As such, it is reasonable that the retailer is better off in grabbing more shares in the enhanced profitability 
when the manufacturer offers warranty for remanufactured products in model MM compared to the benchmark model MN.  
When the retailer offers warranty for remanufactured products in model RR, the retailer directly incurs the warranty cost 
and also directly enjoys the ensuing benefit of enhanced demand for remanufactured products. In this case, the manufacturer 
reaps more secondary benefit from enhanced demand for remanufactured products than the secondary expense for offering 
warranty, leading to a higher share of enhanced profitability for the manufacturer than the retailer. 
 Furthermore, a closer examination of the two members’ profitability in different models reveals that the manufacturer as 
the leader in this CLSC takes a larger share of the channel profit than the retailer does if the manufacturer’s quadratic warranty 
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cost parameters for new and remanufactured products are not too high in models MN and MM. Corollary 1 implies that the 
profit inequity is always narrowed down if the manufacturer offers warranty for remanufactured products, but widened if the 
retailer does. 
5.2 Equilibrium solution analysis 
In this subsection, we compare equilibrium solutions between the two warranty models MM and RR. First, we identify the 
warranty cost parameter boundary conditions under which the manufacturer (retailer) offers a longer warranty period for 
remanufactured products. For apparent reasons, the manufacturer and retailer usually possess different levels of production 
technology and market knowledge. This difference tends to be reflected in different linear and quadratic warranty cost 
parameters ( M Rw wc c  and 
M R
w w  ) when the manufacturer (retailer) offers warranty in model MM (RR). In general, three 
scenarios may arise: Scenario I ( M Rw wc c c   and 
M R
w w  ), Scenario II (
M R
w wc c  and 
M R
w w    ), and Scenario III 
( M Rw wc c  and 
M R
w w  ). Next, we restrict our discussion to Scenario I only and the analysis for Scenario II can be carried 
out in a similar fashion. For the more general scenario of M Rw wc c  and 
M R
w w  , we cannot obtain closed-form solutions to 
compare warranty periods and warranty efficiency between models MM and RR and, hence, the relevant analysis is delegated 
to numerical experiments in Section 6. 
Proposition 3.  Under scenario I when M Rw wc c c  , if 1 2
h M h
M w M     ( { , }h P C ), a longer warranty period for 
remanufactured products is offered by the manufacturer in model MM; if 2
M h
w M  , models MM and RR offer the same 
warranty period; if 2
M h
w M  , a longer warranty period is offered by the retailer in model RR. Here 1
M h
w M   is the lower 
bound of the quadratic cost parameter to guarantee that * 1MM ht n   .  
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in Appendix E. 
As shown in Appendix E, when models MM and RR have the same linear cost parameter M Rw wc c c   but different 
quadratic cost parameters in Scenario I, 2
h
M  is a function of 
R
w . If 1 2
h M h
M w M    , the quadratic cost parameter in the 
manufacturer warranty model MM is more efficient compared to that in the retailer warranty model RR. In this case, the 
manufacturer is willing to offer a longer warranty period for remanufactured products in model MM. On the other hand, if 
2
M h
w M  , the retailer has a more efficient quadratic cost parameter in model RR than the manufacturer does in model MM, so 
the retailer in model RR is able to provide a longer warranty period. It is worth noting that this structural insight on warranty 
period remains valid regardless of the manufacturer’s remanufacturing strategy except for a shifted threshold value of 2
h
M . It 
is also confirmed that 2
C
M  decreases in collection rate  , indicating that a higher collection rate makes it easier for the 
retailer in model RR to offer a longer warranty when the manufacturer remanufactures all available used products.  
Corollary 2. Under scenario I when M Rw wc c c  , if 1 3
h M h
M w M    , a higher retail price is attained for remanufactured 
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products in model MM than RR; if 3
M h
w M  , the retailer sets the same retail price in models MM and RR; if 3
M h
w M  , a 
higher retail price is achieved for remanufactured products in model RR than MM, where 2 3
h h
M M   holds.  
The proof of Corollary 2 is discussed in Appendix F. 
When 1 2
h M h
M w M    , the quadratic cost parameter of the manufacturer warranty model MM is more efficient than that 
in the retailer warranty model RR, the manufacturer is willing to provide a longer warranty period for remanufactured products 
and transfers part of the increased warranty cost to the retailer through the wholesale price, which is eventually passed onto 
consumers by the retailer at a higher retail price ( * *MM h RR hr rp p
  ). At the other extreme end when 3 2
M h h
w M M    , the 
retailer in model RR has a significant relative quadratic cost parameter advantage over the manufacturer does in MM, it is 
natural from Proposition 3 that the retailer's cost advantage is translated into a longer warranty period in model RR. At the 
same time, the retailer can also raise its retail price of remanufactured products to maximize its economic benefit 
( * *MM h RR hr rp p
  ). 
What is more complicated is in the middle range 2 3
h M h
M w M    , where the retailer in model RR has more efficient 
quadratic cost parameter than the manufacturer does in model MM. This cost advantage allows the retailer to offer a longer 
warranty period for remanufactured products in model RR than the manufacturer does in model MM as shown in Proposition 3. 
When the manufacturer offers warranty in model MM, even if its warranty period is shorter than that offered by the retailer in 
RR, the higher warranty cost and the double-marginalization nature of cost transfer to the retailer tend to push higher the retail 
price of remanufactured products in model MM. Conversely, if the retailer offers warranty in model RR, as it is closer to the 
market and can directly influence market demand by offering warranty and setting the retail price of remanufactured products, 
this channel structure allows the retailer to offer a longer warranty period for remanufactured products at a lower retail price in 
model RR. Therefore, the coupling effect of the cost advantage and channel structure leads to * *MM h RR ht t   (Proposition 3) 
and * *MM h RR hr rp p
   when 2 3
h M h
M w M    . Similarly, the structural insight on the retail price of remanufactured products 
remains intact regardless of the manufacturer’s remanufacturing strategy.  
5.3 Analysis of profitability and consumer surplus 
We first compare individual profitability between the two warranty models MM and RR.  
Proposition 4. Under scenario I when M Rw wc c c  , the manufacturer achieves higher profitability in model RR than MM, but 
the retailer reaches higher profitability in model MM than RR. 
The proof of Proposition 4 is furnished in Appendix G. 
When the linear warranty cost parameters are the same in models MM and RR ( M Rw wc c c  ), the manufacturer’s 
provision of warranty allows it to charge a higher wholesale price (leading to a higher unit profit margin) of remanufactured 
products in model MM than RR. When the manufacturer commits to partial remanufacturing, the unit profit margin for new 
products stays the same in models MM and RR in both periods. The quantities of new products in period 1 are the same in both 
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models and the quadratic warranty cost for new products is only occurred in model MM, leading to a lower profit contribution 






  , the manufacturer warranty in 
model MM has a significant relative quadratic cost advantage; this advantage outweighs the double-marginalization effect of 
transferring warranty cost down to the retailer and results in a higher demand for remanufactured products but a lower demand 
for new products in model MM than that in model RR. Hence, the profit contribution from remanufactured products is higher 
for the manufacturer in model MM than that in model RR. On the other hand, the unit profit margin of new products for the 
manufacturer stays the same in model MM and RR. This leads to a lower profit contribution from new products for the 
manufacturer in model MM than that in model RR. And the reduced profitability from new products in the two periods 
outweighs the increased profitability from remanufactured products in model MM and the net effect is that the manufacturer 






 . If the manufacturer warranty model MM has 






  ), the retailer’s offering warranty boosts an even higher demand for 
remanufactured products and cannibalizes more demand for new products in model RR. The heightened demand in this case is 
more than enough to offset the decreased unit profit margin of remanufactured products for the manufacturer in model RR. As 
such, the profit contribution from remanufactured products in model RR is higher than that in model MM. This increased 
profitability from remanufactured products outweighs the change in profitability from new products and the net effect is that 
the manufacturer achieves higher profitability in model RR.  
When the manufacturer commits to complete remanufacturing, if the manufacturer warranty model MM has a significant 





   ), a longer warranty period offered in the MM model (as per Proposition 3) 
boosts more demand for remanufactured products (and the complementary new products in period 1) in model MM than RR. In 
addition, the manufacturer obtains higher unit profit margins of new products in period 1 and remanufactured products in 
model MM than those in model RR. However, the increased demand for remanufactured products produces more severe 
cannibalization of new products in period 2, leading to a significantly lower profitability from new products in period 2 in 
model MM. The increased profitability from new products in period 1 and remanufactured products is insufficient to recover 
the reduced profitability from new products in period 2 in model MM and the net effect is that the manufacturer achieves 






  . If the manufacturer warranty model MM has no 






  ), the manufacturer’s unit profit margin and sales quantity of new 
products in period 1 are lower in model MM than those in model RR. On the other hand, the sale quantity of remanufactured 
products is lower in model MM than RR in this case; the impact of the manufacturer’s higher unit profit margin of 
remanufactured products cannot counterbalance that of the lower demand in model MM compared to model RR, leading to a 
lower profit contribution from remanufactured products for the manufacturer in model MM. It is noted that the manufacturer’s 








  , the manufacturer’s profit from new products in period 2 under model MM is lower than that under model RR. At 
the higher end when Mw  is sufficiently large, the manufacturer achieves a higher profit from new products in period 2 in 
model MM than RR. However, the higher profit from new products in period 2 is insufficient to recover the reduced 
profitability from new products in period 1 and remanufactured products for the manufacturer in model MM and the net effect 
is that the manufacturer achieves higher profitability in model RR than MM. In summary, under scenario I when M Rw wc c c  , 
the manufacturer achieves higher profitability when the retailer offers warranty in model RR than the case when the 
manufacturer offers warranty in model MM. 
Following the similar logic, Proposition 4 confirms that the retailer always obtains higher profitability when the 
manufacturer provides warranty for new and remanufactured products regardless of the manufacturer’s remanufacturing 
strategy. In summary, Proposition 4 demonstrates that, under scenario I when models MM and RR have the same linear cost 
parameter ( M Rw wc c c  ), each member in the CLSC prefers the other to offer warranty for new and remanufactured products, 
and the CLSC may enter an impasse. 
Proposition 5. Under scenario I when M Rw wc c c  , the following results hold. 
i) If 3 3
h
R R   and 2
R h
w R   ( 3 3
h
R R  ), there exist 4 1
h h
M M   such that a higher channel profit is attained in model 




M M  ; a higher channel profit is attained in model RR than MM if 4
M h
w M  ; and an equal 
channel profit is achieved if 4
M h
w M  , { , }h P C . 
ii) If 3 3
h
R R   and 1 2
h R h
R w R    , a higher channel profit is attained in model RR than MM, { , }h P C . 
The proof of Proposition 5 is furnished in Appendix H. 
Proposition 5 shows that the comparison of the channel profit between models MM and RR depends on the net benefit of 
offering warranty for remanufactured products ( 3j ) and quadratic warranty cost parameters regardless of the manufacturer’s 
remanufacturing strategy if M Rw wc c c  . When the net benefit of the retailer offering warranty for remanufactured products is 
low ( 3 3
h
R R  ) and it has a high quadratic warranty cost parameter ( 2
R h
w R  ), or the net benefit of the retailer offering 
warranty for remanufactured products is high ( 3 3
h
R R  ), even if the manufacturer is farther away from the market compared 
to the retailer, its relative quadratic warranty cost advantage ( 1 4
h M h
M w M    ) outweighs the double-marginalization effect , 
leading to a higher channel profit in model MM than that in model RR. As Mw  increases from the lower end, the 
manufacturer’s relative quadratic warranty cost advantage shrinks. When Mw  increases to 4
h
M , the channel profit reaches 
parity for models MM and RR. When Mw  exceeds 4
h
M , the retailer has relative quadratic warranty cost advantage, the 
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warranty efficiency for remanufactured products in model MM turns lower than that in model RR  and, then, a higher channel 
profit is attained in model RR. When the net benefit of the retailer offering warranty for remanufactured products is low 
( 3 3
h
R R  ) but it has an advantageous quadratic warranty cost parameter ( 1 2
h R h
R w R    ), the retailer’s proximity to the 
market and direct influence on market demand by offering warranty lead to a higher channel profit in model RR than MM.  
Next, we compare consumer surplus between the two warranty models MM and RR.  
Proposition 6. Under scenario I when M Rw wc c c  , the following results hold. 
i) When 3
R h
w R  , there exists 5 1
h h
M M   such that consumer surplus is higher in model MM if 1 5
h M h
M w M    ; it is 
the same for models MM and RR if 5
M h
w M  ; it is higher in model RR if 5
M h
w M  , { , }h P C . 
ii) When 1 3
h R h
R w R    , consumer surplus is higher in model RR, { , }h P C . 
The proof of Proposition 6 is given in Appendix I. 
Proposition 6.i) shows that consumer surplus is higher in model MM than RR if the retailer’s provision of warranty has a 
sufficiently large quadratic cost parameter ( 3
R h
w R  ) and the manufacturer’s provision of warranty has a relative quadratic 
cost advantage ( 1 5
h M h
M w M    . NB: 1
h
M  is the lower bound of 
M
w  to ensure that 
* 1MM ht n   ). Under this condition, 
if the manufacturer commits to partial remanufacturing, demands for new products in period 1 are the same in models MM and 
RR, but it is higher in model MM than RR if the manufacturer commits to complete remanufacturing. On the other hand, 
regardless of the manufacturer’s remanufacturing strategy, in period 2, offering warranty by the manufacturer in model MM has 
a more notable impact on enhancing demand for remanufactured products compared to model RR. Although this causes more 
severe cannibalization of demand for new products in period 2, the increase in the quantity of remanufactured products is more 
rapid than the decrease in the quantity of new products. Therefore, it is natural that consumer surplus is higher in model MM 
than RR regardless of the manufacturer’s remanufacturing strategy.  
However, when Mw  increases to 5
h
M , the manufacturer’s relative quadratic cost advantage of offering warranty 
disappears and a parity is reached in the quantities of new and remanufactured products, leading to the same consumer surplus 
in models MM and RR. When Mw  further increases beyond 5
h
M , the retailer now has a relative quadratic cost advantage of 
offering warranty. In this case, if the manufacturer commits to partial remanufacturing, demands for new products in period 1 
are the same in models MM and RR, but offering warranty by the retailer in model RR has a more significant impact on 
enhancing demand for remanufactured products, which outweighs the demand cannibalization of new products in period 2, 
leading to higher consumer surplus in model RR than MM. If the manufacturer is engaged in complete remanufacturing, 
offering warranty by the retailer in model RR is more effective in enhancing demand for remanufactured products and, 
subsequently, the complementary new products in period 1. On the other hand, offering warranty by the retailer causes more 
severe cannibalization of demand for new products in period 2 in model RR, but the cannibalization does not outweigh the 
increases in demands for remanufactured products in period 2 and new products in period 1, resulting in higher consumer 
surplus in model RR than MM. Similarly, Proposition 6.ii) corresponds to the case that the retailer possesses relative quadratic 
cost advantage of offering warranty ( 3
R h
w R  ) and, hence, higher consumer surplus is achieved when the retailer provides 
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warranty in model RR. 
6 Numerical experiment 
In this section, we present numerical studies to verify the analytical results in Section 5 by comparing equilibrium decisions as 
well as profits and consumer surplus between different models with a general setting of M Rw wc c  and 
M R
w w  . Let 
220Q  , 100nc  , 60rc  , 0.7  , 5
R
wc  , 80
R
w  , 10n  , 8r  , and we obtain the relevant charts by varying 
the values of parameters Mw  and 
M
wc . Because the manufacturer’s remanufacturing strategy has no significant impact on the 
main results, the numerical studies are confined to the scenario of partial remanufacturing. We first plot the warranty period 












(a) Warranty period                                        (b) Retail price 
Figure 1. The warranty period and retail price of remanufactured products in the two warranty models 
It can be seen from Fig. 1 that, when Mw  and 
M
wc  are small and the manufacturer warranty has significant cost 
advantage, the MM model has a longer warranty period and higher retail price for remanufactured products than the RR model 
does, and the higher the Mw  and 
M
wc , the shorter (longer) the warranty period and the lower (higher) the retail price for 
remanufactured products in model MM (RR). When the warranty cost parameters meet the condition 
2 2
( 8)(0.7 3) (0.35 1.3) 12
( 8) 0.84 ( 8) 0.42
M M R R
w w w w
M M R R
w w w w
c c c c
c c 
   
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       

   
), 
the retailer warranty cost advantage becomes significant and, hence, the warranty period (retail price) of remanufactured 
products in model MM becomes shorter (lower) than that in model RR. By fixing 5M Rw wc c  , it is confirmed that, if 
2 10.714
M P R
w M w       ( 3 13.187 1.115
M P R
w M w      ), the warranty period (retail price) of remanufactured products 
in model MM is shorter (lower) than that in model RR. These results verify the conclusions in Proposition 3 and Corollary 2. 
Next, under the same settings, we plot the individual and channel profits as well as consumer surplus against the two 
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parameters Mw  and 
M


















 (c) Channel profit                                      (d) Consumer surplus 
Figure 2. Comparisons of individual and channel profits, and consumer surplus between the two warranty models 
It is clear from Fig. 2 that, when manufacturer warranty has a significant relative cost advantage at sufficiently small Mw  
and Mwc , individual and channel profit as well as consumer surplus are all higher in model MM than those in model RR. 
However, as Mw  and 
M
wc  increase, these metrics in model MM decrease and turn lower than those in model RR. In terms of 
individual profit, we find that the manufacturer achieves a higher profit in model RR than that in MM regardless of Mw  if 
M R
w wc c , and the retailer attains a higher profit in model MM than that in model RR regardless of 
M
w  if 
M
wc  is not 
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significantly larger than Rwc . This result indicates that, if 
M
wc  is significantly larger than 
R
wc , both members are better off in 
profitability when the retailer offers warranty for new and remanufactured products. In terms of the channel profit, by setting 
5M Rw wc c  , one can confirm that 4 74.9396
P
M   exists if 3 1
2
3R R
   and 2 46.5356
R P
w R   . When 4 74.9396
M P
w M    
( 4 74.9396
M P
w M   ), the channel profit is higher (lower) in model MM than that in model RR. As for consumer surplus, if  
3 67.8571
R P
w R    and 5 40
M P
w M    ( 3 67.8571
R P
w R    and 5 40
M P
w M   ), consumer surplus is higher (lower) in 
model MM than that in model RR. These results verify the conclusions in Propositions 4, 5 and 6. 
In general, these numerical studies allow us to infer that individual and channel profits as well as consumer surplus in 
model MM are higher than those in model RR when both the manufacturer’s quadratic and linear warranty cost ( Mw  and 
M
wc ) 
are sufficiently efficient compared to those in the retailer warranty model RR. Otherwise, they are lower in model MM than 
those in model RR. 
7 Conclusions 
For a two-period CLSC consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, this study establishes four Stackelberg game models to 
incorporate the warranty policies for new and remanufactured products. The manufacturer is modeled as the leader and the 
retailer is the follower. We consider two warranty models where either the manufacturer or the retailer offers warranty for new 
and remanufactured products and two corresponding benchmark models with warranty for new products only. We derive the 
optimal wholesale and retail pricing as well as warranty period decisions for the models. By analyzing and comparing 
equilibrium solutions and the resulting sales quantities, individual and channel profits as well as consumer surplus, the 
following results are obtained. 
Firstly, the conditions are identified to guarantee the offering of warranty for remanufactured products: the manufacturer 
in model MM and the retailer in model RR are willing to offer warranty for remanufactured products if and only if they can 
benefit from it (Lemma 1). Secondly, the remanufacturing strategy (partial or complete remanufacturing) and warranty for 
remanufactured products do not affect the pricing strategies of new products in the second period, but they influence the 
pricing of new products in the first period and remanufactured products in the second period (Proposition 1). Thirdly, offering 
warranty for remanufactured products improves the sales quantity of remanufactured products, thereby enhancing individual 
and channel profits, and consumer surplus in the CLSC (Proposition 2); meanwhile, it also attains a more equitable channel 
profit distribution between the two members if the manufacturer provides warranty for remanufactured products (Corollary 1). 
Finally, by comparing the two warranty models MM and RR, we find that the member who has relative warranty cost 
advantage offers a longer warranty period for remanufactured products (Proposition 3). If the manufacturer (retailer) has a 
significant linear and quadratic warranty cost advantage over the retailer (the manufacturer), the manufacturer (retailer) should 
be entrusted to offer the warranty for new and remanufactured products, which can lead to higher individual and channel 
profitability as well as consumer surplus (Fig. 2). 
This paper only considers a CLSC consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer where the manufacturer produces new 
22 
 
products in two periods and remanufactures used products in the second period, and sells them to the retailer. In practice, 
remanufacturing may be performed by a third-party remanufacturer, and products may be sold to multiple retailers. Therefore, 
future research can be extended to consider warranty policies for new and remanufactured products with competition and 
cooperation among multiple agents. 
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Appendices: Supplementary materials 
Appendix A: Proof of the derivation process of the equilibrium solutions in the four models  
For a more concise presentation of equilibrium solutions, we introduce the following notation, 
0 ( )
j
j n w nQ c c     , 1 ( )
j
j n w n rc c c      , 2 (1 )
j
j w     , 3
j
j r wc   , 4 0 1j j j    , 
2
0 1 (1 )      , 
2
2 34MM M M    , 
2
2 34RR R R    , 
24 MMM Mw M    , and 
22 RRR Rw R    , where { , }j M R , representing the 
manufacturer and retailer, respectively. 
Appendix A-1: Equilibrium solution derivation for model MM 
In model MM, the Lagrangian function for the retailer’s optimization problem is stated as follows: 
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1 1 1( , , ) ( )
MM MM
R n r R rL p p p q q     , where 1  is the Lagrangian multiplier and 1 1( ) 0rq q   . According to backward 
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These response functions are then substituted into the manufacturer’s profit function MMM . If 
2
2 3 04MM M M     , the 
manufacturer’s profit function is strictly and jointly concave in decision variables nw , rw  and t. In this case, model MM has 
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  , one can confirm that the manufacturer’s profit function MMM  is strictly concave in decision variable 1w  and, 
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Thus, the optimal pricing decisions of new and remanufactured products and the warranty period for remanufactured products 
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  , respectively. 
According to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition, there are two possible cases for the optimal solutions corresponding to 
different Lagrangian coefficient 1  as follows. 
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respectively. Then, according to * *1 0
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rq q   , we obtain the condition for Case I as 
0






   

     .  




rq q    (denoted as complete remanufacturing) can be derived based on the 














rq q   . By substituting it into 























2 02 ( )(2 ) (4 (1 (1 ) ( () ))
2











c           

       






































    


   . Hence, the optimal 



















































































 , respectively. 








     is derived from 1 0  , corresponding to the condition for Case II.  
Thus, the equilibrium solutions are obtained for model MM. 
Appendix A-2: Equilibrium solution derivation for model RR 
In model RR, the Lagrangian function for the retailer’s optimization problem is given as: 
1 1 1( , , , ) ( )
RR RR
R n r R rL p p p t q q     , where 2  is the Lagrangian multiplier and 2 1( ) 0rq q   . According to backward 


























































































, one confirms that, if 22 3 02RR R R     , the retailer’s 
Lagrangian function 1( , , , )
RR
R n rL p p p t  is strictly and jointly concave in decision variables np , rp  and t , meaning that 
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, then, one can confirm that the manufacturer’s 
profit function RRM  is strictly and jointly concave in decision variables nw  and rw . Then, model RR has a unique optimal 
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can confirm that the manufacturer’s profit function RRM  is strictly concave in decision variable 1w  and, thus, has a unique 
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According to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition, there exist two possible cases for the optimal solutions corresponding to 
different Lagrangian coefficient 2  as follows. 
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     is derived from 2 0  , corresponding to the condition for Case II. 
Thus, we confirm the equilibrium solutions for model RR. 
Appendix A-3: Equilibrium solution derivation for model MN 
In model MN, the Lagrangian function for the retailer’s optimization problem is furnished as follows: 
1 3 1( , , ) ( )
MN MN
R n r R rL p p p q q     , where 3  is the Lagrangian multiplier and 3 1( ) 0rq q   . According to backward 
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R n rL p p p  is strictly and jointly concave in decision variables np  and rp , hence, has a unique optimal solution. 
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These two response functions are then substituted into the manufacturer’s profit function 1( , , )
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According to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition, two possible cases may arise for the optimal solutions corresponding to 
different Lagrangian coefficient 3  as follows.  
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MN MN
rq q    can be obtained from the Complementary 
Relaxation Theorem. Therefore, we obtain the condition for Case I as 0 0 0( ) (1 ) ( )M M r MQ c Q            . 
















rq q   . By substituting it into the manufacturer’s and retailer’s optimal 
solutions, we have * 41
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    , respectively. Furthermore, 0 00 ( ) (1 )r M Mc Q          is derived from 3 0  , 
corresponding to the condition for Case II. 
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Thus, we obtain the equilibrium solutions for model MN. 
Appendix A-4: Equilibrium solution derivation for model RN 
In model RN, the Lagrangian function for the retailer’s optimization problem is given as follows: 
1 4 1( , , ) ( )
RN RN
R n r R rL p p p q q    , where 4  is the Lagrangian multiplier and 4 1( ) 0rq q   . According to backward 
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According to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition, there exist two possible cases for the optimal solutions corresponding to 
different Lagrangian coefficient 4  as follows. 





































Hence, the optimal quantities, individual and channel profits are derived as * 01 4
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respectively. Then, * *1 0
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rq q    is confirmed by the Complementary Relaxation Theorem. Therefore, we derive the 
condition for Case I as 0 0 0( ) (1 ) ( )R R r RQ c Q            . 
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    , respectively. Furthermore, 
0 00 ( ) (1 )r R Rc Q          is derived from 4 0  , corresponding to the condition for Case II. 
Thus, the equilibrium solutions are confirmed for model RN. 
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1 
When the manufacturer commits to partial remanufacturing, by subtracting the wholesale and retail prices of 
remanufactured products under models MN and RN from those under models MM and RR, respectively, we get 











     , * * 0RR P RN Pr rw w














      , and 
1* 3* 0
4
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When the manufacturer commits to complete remanufacturing, by subtracting the wholesale and retail prices of 
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Proposition 1 is thus proved. 
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2 
When the manufacturer commits to partial remanufacturing, by subtracting the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s profits 
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under models MN and RN from those under models MM and RR, respectively, we can obtain 
2 2
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When the manufacturer commits to complete remanufacturing, by subtracting the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s profits 













       , 
2 2 2 2 2






MM C MM C MN C M MM M M
R R R
MM
     
  
 
        ,  
2 2 2










       , 
2 2 2










       . Then, * * * 0MM C MM C MM CT M R  
       and 
* * * 0RR C RR C RR CT M R  
       can be verified. By subtracting consumer surplus under models MN and RN from that under 
models MM and RR, respectively, we can obtain 
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Proposition 2 is thus proved. 
Appendix D: Proof of Corollary 1 
When the manufacturer commits to partial remanufacturing, by subtracting the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s profits 
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When the manufacturer commits to complete remanufacturing, by subtracting the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s profits 
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This completes the proof of Corollary 1. 
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 3 
It can be seen from 2 34 (1 ) 0M
M











 is the condition for model MM to have a 
unique optimal solution. In addition, given the assumption 1t n  , we can derive another boundary of Mw , denoted by 
1
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M  as shown below. 
When the manufacturer commits to partial remanufacturing, by subtracting the optimal warranty period under model RR 




MM P RR P P M
R R wt t f  






  . Solving equation 
( ) 0P Mwf    for 
M














. In addition, we can derive 3 1 31 0
( )
4 (1 )





















 and 2 1
P P
M M   , the conclusion of Proposition 3 is confirmed under the partial 
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remanufacturing strategy as well. 
Proposition 3 is thus proved. 
Appendix F: Proof of Corollary 2 
By subtracting the optimal retail price under model RR from that under model MM, we obtain 
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This completes the proof of Corollary 2. 
Appendix G: Proof of Proposition 4 
When the manufacturer commits to partial remanufacturing, by subtracting the manufacturer's profit in model RR from 
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Proposition 4 is thus proved. 
Appendix H: Proof of Proposition 5 
By subtracting the channel profit in model RR from that in model MM when the manufacturer commits to partial 
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R R  , Proposition 5 is proved when the manufacturer commits to partial remanufacturing.  
By subtracting the channel profit in model RR from that in model MM when the manufacturer commits to complete 
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 , Proposition 5 is proved when the manufacturer commits to complete remanufacturing.  
This completes the proof of Proposition 5. 
Appendix I: Proof of Proposition 6 
By subtracting the optimal consumer surplus in model RR from that in model MM, we have 
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   , 5 1
C C
M M  . In this case, if 1 5
C M C
M w M    , ( ) 0
M
w
CG    and, then, 
* * 0MM C RR CCS CS   ;  if 5
M C
w M  , ( ) 0
M
w
CG    and, then, 
* * 0MM C RR CCS CS   ; if 5
M C
w M  , ( ) 0
M
w
CG    and, then 
* * 0MM C RR CCS CS   . If 1 3
C R C
R w R    , 5 1
C C
M M   and, thus 
* * 0MM C RR CCS CS   . 
This completes the proof of Proposition 6. 
 
